NIH regulations,S is consistent with this view. The Nuremberg Code, formulated on the basis of international criminal law by American judges sitting in the Nazi War Crimes Trials, sets forth ten prerequi sites for legal human experimentation. The first principle deals with the informed consent of the research subject, or what may be termed the subject's rights. The other nine principles have primarily to do with protecting the subject's welfare: they set forth actions that must be taken prior to seeking subject enrollment in the experiment. These actions include a determination that the experiment is designed prop erly to yield fruitful results "unprocurable by other methods"; that its "anticipated results" will justify performance of the experiment; that all "unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury" is avoided; that there is no "a priori reason to believe that death or disabling in jury will occur"; that the project has "humanitarian importance" that outweighs the degree of risk; that "adequate preparation" is taken to "protect the experimental subject against even the remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death"; that only "scientifically qualified" per sons conduct the experiment; that the subject can terminate participa tion at any time; and that the experimenter is prepared to terminate the experiment if "continuation is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject."9 NIH and FDA have codified these general preconditions in their regulations, and local committees, called Institutional Review Boards (lRBs) are mandated to review research protocols prior to subject re cruitment to see to it that these preconditions have been observed.1O OUf initial experience with heart transplantation, and our current ex perience with the artificial heart, illustrate how informed consent can be used improperly as an excuse to justify massive assaults on the wel fare of human subjects, even though the quality of the consent is highly questionable, and the quality of the experiment itself does not meet the welfare requirements of the Nuremberg Code.
I.
INFORMED CONSENT TO HEART TRANSPLANTATION Professor Katz's casebook Experimentation with Human Be ings,11 has had a profound impact on my own thinking, and I used it as a text in more than a dozen courses during the 1970s. It is the finest 8. Protection of Human Subjects, FDA, HHS, 46 Fed. Reg. 8942 (1981) . See also Proposed Model Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, Office of Science and Technology, 51 Fed. Reg. 20,204 (1986 (pp. 130-39) .
In this chapter, Katz persuasively demonstrates that Philip Blaiberg, the recipient of the world's second human-to-human heart transplant, regressed when in the presence of Dr. Christiaan Barnard. He saw him as an "omnipotent parent and hero ... Barnard became General Smuts, under whom Blaiberg had served and admired greatly ... Bar nard also became Christ, the powerful protector" (p. 132). But in identifying Barnard as Christ, Blaiberg may have "confused his own identity with that of the surgeon" (pp. 132-33) . He actually said he wanted to go through with the operation "not only for my sake but for you [Barnard] and your team who put so much into your effort to save Louis Washkansky" (p. 132). Barnard himself seemed unaware of this confusion on the part of his patient, and of his own conflict of interest between wanting to perform the world's second human heart trans plant for himself, and attempting to convince Blaiberg that the opera tion was in Blaiberg's best interests. Indeed, Barnard even began talking about the operation as fulfilling not his own goals, but "Washkansky's dream." This, as Professor Katz notes, "is startling and suggests that he was as confused about his identity as Blaiberg was about his own" (pp. 139-40) . Louis Washkansky, the recipient of the world's first human-to human heart transplant, it turned out, also was not particularly inter ested in discussing the details of heart transplantation. Barnard did not press the issue, deciding "no words were needed." But were they? Katz argues that more words (conversation) may not have changed the ultimate decision, but could have improved "the nature and qual ity of Barnard's and Washkansky's thinking about available choices" (p. 137).
.
Both, at best, had reflected on the forthcoming operation in isola tion, and neither had any idea what had transpired in the other's mind. At the least, respect for Washkansky's psychological auton omy required Barnard to challenge his patient's silent acquies cence.... If Washkansky wanted a new heart, he also had to have the heart to learn more about the operation (pp. 140-41).13
Katz continues by noting that since the first heart transplant op 12. Id. at 640-42. 13. (emphasis added).
erations were "extraordinary" procedures, candidates should be re quired to learn about them, and not permitted to give disclosure and consent. "Barnard should have insisted they talk for a while" (p. 141). Katz concludes his discussion of this case by noting the common clinical controversy over whether to respect the patient's "rights" or "needs" (p. 141). I shall restate this "conflict" by attempting to con struct a system that protects both the "rights" and "welfare" of sub jects of "extraordinary" human experimentation.
Katz presents a psychoanalytic explanation of the dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship in the dramatic human experimenta tion context, and suggests conversation· to help elucidate issues of transference and countertransference. He argues powerfully that "[m]agical and hopeful expectations exist side by side with expecta tions of cruel disappointmen.t" (p. 144). And later, he notes that when medical knowledge and skill prove impotent against the claims of na ture, "all kinds of senseless interventions are tried in an unconscious effort to cure the incurable magically through a 'wonder drug,' a novel surgical procedure, or a penetrating psychological interpretation" (p. 151). He hopes that through education, [aJt least medical students can learn to appreciate that it may be their magical hopes that cause them to intervene, rather than believ ing that they are responding to the magical expectations 0/ their pa tients. Thus doctors' heroic attempts to try anything may not necessarily be responsive to patients' needs but may turn out to be a projection o/their own needs onto patients (p. 151).14 This powerful insight is descriptive not only of the behavior of human heart transplant pioneers, but also seems to have set the stan dard for the behavior of surgeons involved in artificial heart experi mentation. In his autobiography, One Life, 15 Christiaan Barnard has a conversation with himself in which he tries to explain why he did not have further discussions with Louis Washkansky about the risks and likely outcomes of the first human-to-human heart transplant:
I offered a chance, and he grabbed it, without asking any questions. But it also indicates that Dr. Barnard believed that for Washkansky there really is no choice; that since he was dying he must accept a heart transplant. It was his only hope, and some hope is always better than none. Later, Dr. Barnard refined the analogy, and the rationale for action in the absence of full discussion, by arguing that for Washkan sky the alternatives were so obvious that the choice was trivial:
For a dying man, it is not a difficult decision because he knows he is at the end. If a lion chases you to the bank of a river filled with crocodiles, you will leap into the water convinced you have a chance to swim to the other side. But you would never accept such odds if there were no lion. 17 This "lion and the crocodiles" analogy has become the standard by which artificial heart experimenters discuss the decisions of their patient-subjects to this day. For example, when Dr. Denton Cooley implanted the world's first total artificial heart into the chest of Has kell Karp, in 1969, he initially argued that his own skill and the pa tient's consent were the only justification needed:
I have done more heart surgery than anyone else in the world .... 
Id. (emphasis added)
. Recently, Dr. Barnard has moved to the United States, "discovered" Glycosphingolipids, a compound he believes rejuvenates the skin, and has begun arguing that physicians should be legally granted "the right of active euthanasia .... [Because] [t]here is no point in using medical technology to prolong a painful death or an empty life." In discussing his own past heart transplant work he says individuals inevitably and wrongly asked him "how long" his patients had survived. "They should have asked whether surgery had improved the patient's life. If so, it was a success, even if he survived only a few months. If not, it had failed, no matter how long he lived...." He argues that "patients usually understand this better than the rest of us":
They are seldom obsessed with surviving at all costs, and they grow less so in proportion to their illness. More recently we have witnessed the advent of "permanent" arti ficial hearts, and renewed interest in using artificial hearts on a tempo rary basis as a "bridge" (or "tollgate") to a human heart transplant. The informed consent issues explicated by Katz remain relegated to matters of secondary concern and unaddressed in any but crude and primitive manners.
II. PERMANENT ARTIFICIAL HEARTS AND INFORMED CONSENT
Prior to performing the world's first permanent artificial heart im plant, Dr. William DeVries, like Dr. Cooley, underlined his view of the importance of informed consent as the primary justification for performing the procedure. One major problem was that the only power source available was an approximately 400 pound drive cart, which had to be attached to both a power source and a source of com pressed air, that made ambulation almost impossible. Many, includ ing· one of the device's designers, Dr. Robert Jarvik, believed the device shouldn't be used on humans until it was easily portable or entirely implantable. Dr. DeVries disagreed:
Many people have asked us the question as to-it's not fully im plantable, why then would you do it? Why don't you wait ten years, when it's implantable, and then do it? But the key is informed consent. Why should I let people die, when I can give them a chance to live-if they're willing to accept the limitations of the external pumping system?20 19. J. THORWALD, THE PATIENTS 402 (1971) (emphasis added). The Karp implant led to a lawsuit by his widow against Dr. Cooley primarily alleging lack of informed con sent. Both the trial court and the appeals court summarily dismissed the notion that more than the patient's consent was needed to justify this experiment. They concluded that the implant was therapy for a dying man: "[T]he record contains no evidence that Mr. Karp's treatment was other than therapeutic and we agree that in this context an action for experi mentation must be measured by traditional evidentiary malpractice standards." Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974) , aff'g Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972 ). This conclusion is untenable. Either the judge was not presented with suffi cient evidence at trial about the nature of this first-of-its-kind human experiment, or the judge viewed the risks involved as irrelevant. For a fuller discussion of this case, see G. J. ANNAS, L. H. GLANTZ & B. F. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTA TION: THE SUBJECT 'S DILEMMA 11-14 (1977) .
20. Nova, Artificial Heart (Time-Life Video 1984) at 3 (transcript). The other major problem was and remains the incompatibility of human blood and the device's surface that leads to clotting. [Vol. 9:89 Dr. DeVries is certainly correct insofar as he asserts that the in formed consent of his subject is a necessary prerequisite to acceptable human experimentation: if the subject's competent, voluntary, in formed and understanding consent cannot be obtained, the experiment cannot be performed lawfully or ethically.21 Even in this regard, how ever, it can be argued persuasively that although the consent form and process used by Dr. DeVries in the Barney Clark case is a vast im provement over the consent process used by Dr. Christiaan Barnard, and a considerable improvement over the consent form and process used by Dr. Denton Cooley, it was still seriously deficient.
Specifically, Dr. Clark signed an eleven page consent form that is more notable for its length than its content. It was incomplete, inter nally inconsistent, and confusing. It assumed, as his physicians then believed, that Dr. Clark would either die on the table, or go home in about ten days and continue to be mentally competent for the rest of his life. It took no account at all of a "halfway success"; survival cou pled with severe confusion, mental incompetence, or coma. The con sent form made no provisions for proxy consent to additional procedures or experiments in the event of incompetence, for a mecha nism to terminate the experiment, or for how Dr. Clark would die. These and other shortcomings are serious and evidence a lack of clear thinking and planning on the part of Dr. DeVries and the Utah IRB.22 But one can argue that it is easy to be critical of any initial attempt, and that no local IRB could have done better. As Professor Al Jonsen has put it, the Utah IRB, in devising a consent form and process with Dr. DeVries MED. 292 (1984) .
been for the worse. Since Dr. DeVries moved to Humana Audubon in Louisville, Kentucky, to conduct his permanent artificial heart im plants, he has done three more as of December, 1986 . In May, 1985 after completing all four of his implants, he discussed the issue of in formed consent to the artificial heart with New York Times medical writer, Dr. Lawrence K. Altman. Dr. Altman reports:
Dr. DeVries has repeatedly said that the four men in whom he has implanted artificial hearts were so coerced by their diseases that they felt that death was their only alternative. In signing the 17 page consent form, each recipient, Dr. DeVries has said, "told me in their own way that they didn't care" if they read it or not, and had signed it primarily because they had to [in order] to get the device. 24 This is a devastating admission from a surgeon who uses in formed consent as the primary justification for permanent artificial heart implants in humans. Was it the patients or Dr. DeVries who believed in every case that "death was their only alternative?" And what would it take to persuade Dr. DeVries either that there were other alternatives, or that death could be preferable to the "magic machine?"25 Professor Katz's concern with requiring conversation, 25. After performing his second implant, on William Schroeder, Dr. DeVries had this to say on when he might consider calling a halt to the experiment: "[I]t's impractical on the basis of two patients to determine whether or not these questions [whether society can afford artificial heart implants] can be answered. The third patient may have a stroke, the fourth patient may have a stroke, the fifth patient may have a stroke. In that case the question is not going to be can society pay for it. The question wi:! be: is it proper to even do this? Should it even be done anymore?" Q&A: Dr. William C DeVries, Louisville Cou rier J., Feb. 3, 1985, at 13, col. 2 (emphasis added) .
And after the first four permanent artificial heart implants, the director of the Humana Heart Institute was asked how Humana could argue that any progress was being made given the severe problems suffered by the recipients. Dr. Lansing replied: "Yes, there is progress. [William] Schroeder is improving and showing signs of recovery; [Murray] Haydon will soon be off the respirator and beginning to make a recovery; and yes, [Jack] Burcham has required dialysis for a pre-op condition, but we hope it is temporary. All the patients are living, and at this time none ofthe three has a condition that is either irreversible or immediately life-threatening." AM. MED. NEWS, May 10, 1985, at 58 (emphasis added). This statement, made on April 24, 1985, unfortunately turned out to be wishful thinking. Within hours, Mr. Burcham was dead. Also, prior to their deaths, Mr. Schroeder suffered subsequent devastating strokes, and Mr. Haydon was not able to leave his intensive care room for more than brief periods. The only other patient in the world to receive the Jarvik 7 as a permanent implant, Leif Stenberg, suffered a stroke and died, and the Swedish sur geon who did the implant, Bjarne Semb, has said publicly that he will not do any more implants because the device is simply too crude and causes such terrible effects in its recipi ents. Of Mr. Stenberg, Dr. Semb said, "[h]e might as well have died." Kolata, Surgeons Disagree on Artificial Heart, 230 SCIENCE 786 (1985) .
It is possible to make an argument that the initial implant in Barney Clark was justifi and exploring what myths or beliefs the surgeons and their patients are harboring that permit them to accept silence seems especially criti cal when dealing with the most highly publicized experiment in the history of the world. The primary rationale for accepting silence seems to be the same one that comforted Drs. Barnard and Cooley: the patient was dying and so had no choice. In Dr. DeVries' words concerning Dr. Barney Clark: "He was too old for a transplant, there were no drugs that would help; the only thing that he could look forward to was dying."26
These experiences raise the question as to whether we can ever justify experimentation on very sick, terminally ill patients. Doesn't their disease, Solzhenitsyn's story of Oleg notwithstanding, inevitably coerce them into "volunteering" for something they necessarily will see as hopeful? And won't parents inevitably volunteer their children for even bizarre and unprecedented experiments, like xenografts, if they are led to believe the experiment might prevent death?27 Here able in that it was not known "a priori" that it would cause such devastating results. It is no longer possible reasonably to make this argument. Recipients have died and/or suffered devastating problems. It would seem that there is simply not enough known about an ticoagulation therapy to prevent either bleeding or strokes, for this device to be used in humans at this time. More animal and laboratory research is required before human exper imentation can ethically recommence.
It should also be emphasized that while the inventor and researcher may believe in the Jarvik-7, almost no one else does. The NIH Working Group, for example, while endorsing research on fully implantable electrical artificial hearts, noted that "pneumatically actuated ... systems that do not permit substantial levels of ambulation and relatively normal activ ity are importantly suboptimal." WORKING GROUP ON MECHANICAL CIRCULATORY Sup PORT OF THE NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE, ARTIFICIAL HEART AND ASSIST DEVICES: DIRECTIONS, NEEDS, COSTS, SOCIETAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 33 (1985) (emphasis added).
26. Clark, An Incredible Affair of the Heart, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1982, at 71-72 . See also supra note 17.
27. Perhaps the example of the most "magical thinking" in recent history is provided by Dr. Leonard Bailey and his transplant of a baboon's heart into a dying infant known as "Baby Fae." Of course this infant herself could not consent to this first-of-its-kind human experiment, and since one of the primary hypotheses being tested (the effectiveness of cyc1osporin on xenografts) could have been tested on an adult, I believe this experiment should not have been tried first on a child who could not agree to it. The case was made even worse because the infant's parents were separated, and the family impoverished. But Dr. Bailey's belief in himself and his procedure is remarkable. Within ten days after the transplant he said, "[i]n the best scenario, Baby Fae will celebrate her 21 st birthday with out the need offurther surgery. That possibility exists." Breo, Interview with "Baby Fae's" Surgeon: Therapeutic Intent was Topmost, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1984, at l. In fact, this was never a realistic or reasonable expectation, and it raises serious ques tions both about Dr. Bailey's ability to separate science from emotion (or to distinguish medicine from magic), and what exactly he led the parents of Baby Fae to expect. 1 have said flatly that this transplant was an "inadequately reviewed, inappropriately consented to, premature experiment on an impoverished, terminally ill newborn that cannot be justified"; Katz helps us again, by insisting on explicit recognition of the limits of interventions at the end of life. Of course, we can justify experimenta tion on such individuals only if we can obtain their voluntary and in formed consent.
But informed consent alone is an insufficient justification for radi cal human experimentation. Proper attention to the other nine precepts of the Nuremberg Code, for example, would have required us to address the question of whether there isn't an "a priori" reason to believe that "death or disabling injury" will necessarily follow from this experiment; whether such a "halfway success" of continued life in a severely compromised state doesn't amount to "unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury"; and whether the "anticipated re sults" justify the performance of this experiment. The welfare of the subject of this experiment does not seem to have been addressed ade quately, and until it was, consent for the experiment should not have been sought.
Dr. DeVries sometimes seemed to justify this experimental short coming by acting as if he believed he was engaged in therapy, not ex perimentation at all. At times, for example, he suggested that his goal was to get his patient to go home, or to "playa round of golf." In fact, this scenario never seems to have been realistic. Dr. Clark realized, and that "therapy was never a realistic goal." Annas, Baby Fae: The "Anything Goes" School ofHuman Experimentation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 15-17. Others have been somewhat kinder, but consistent with Katz's "magical thinking" hypothesis. The experiment, for example, has been described as a "leap of faith." Dr. Jack Provonsha, Director of Lorna Linda's Center for Christian Bioethics, has even asserted that such "leaps of faith" are more likely to occur at religious institutions like Lorna Linda (predominately Seventh Day Adventists): "The person who is part of a supportive, communal religion can 'become more secure' in the atmosphere, and then may be willing to take chances that a less secure, less religiously committed individual is willing to take." Colen, Ethics and Baby Fae, Newsday, Nov. 2, 1984, Part II, at 2, col. 1. This seems more "faith healing" than science. Cf Fox, It's the Same, but Different: A Sociological Perspective on the Case ofthe Utah Artificial Heart, in AFTER BARNEY CLARK, supra note 22, at 68-90 (discussion of the role for Mormonism in the Barney Clark case).
Medical-scientific commentators on Dr. Bailey's published paper on Baby Fae, Bailey, Nehlsen-Cannarella, Concepcion & Jolley, Baboon-to-Human Cardiac Xenotransplantation in a Neonate, 254 J. A.M.A. 3321 (1985) , used words like "essentially irrelevant" to de scribe the tissue typing done on the baboon, and "wishful thinking" to describe the "belief that the infant's immune system was immature and thus more readily immunosup pressed ...." Jonasson & Hardy, The Case ofBaby Fae, 254 J. A.M.A. 3358, 3359 (1985) . Bailey later accused these authorities of "representing dated, historical thinking . A.M.A. 3339 (1985) .
shortly before his death, that although he also had hoped for some therapeutic gain, he had become involved in "pure non-therapeutic ex perimentation" for others. Asked by Dr. DeVries in his only publicly shown videotaped interview if the experience had been hard, Dr. Clark replied, "[y]es, it's been hard, but the heart itself has pumped right all along and I think it's doing well."28 Clark, it seems, fully realized what DeVries could not admit openly: the subject, who at the outset was a patient seen as an end with the artificial heart used as a means to sustain him, had become simply a means to the end of sustaining the artificial heart. Dr. Clark nonetheless might have agreed to this exper iment in advance even if he had known that he would spend most of his 112 remaining days on earth in an intensive care unit,· extremely debilitated and depressed, and mentally incompetent at most times. But if this had been known, the IRB should not have approved the experiment since it would have violated most of the basic precepts of subject protection set forth in the Nuremberg Code.
Consent, even informed consent, cannot convert an otherwise un acceptable experiment into an acceptable one. Before patients are asked to consent to experimental procedures, the procedure itself must be judged independently to be a reasonable one to perform on a human being. Using informed consent in a vacuum without such independent review, makes desperate, dying patients targets for quackery, because an offer of "life" from a physician (whom patients are likely to mistake and misidentify as Christ or God) is an offer dying patients are in no reasonable position to refuse. Use of informed consent in this context converts it from a shield designed to protect the patient into a sword designed to attack the patient's vulnerability. There is an element of paternalism in this suggestion, of course, but no more than that in volved in licensing physicians, including these experimenters, and reg ulating prescription drugs. But we are unlikely to succeed at protecting subject welfare unless we provide terminally ill patients with more procedural protections than we provide healthy volunteers. Much more imaginative work needs to be done on informed consent to permanent implants (and more experimentation with animal models as well) before additional implants can be justified. IRBs have been unable to contribute much to protecting patients in this setting, and although their prior review is legally and ethically required, it has been superficial to date and remains insufficient to protect potential subjects Following a three day visit to Dr. DeVries in August, 1985, I suggested further explo ration of a number of problem areas in informed consent:
[L]et me outline some of the major areas of concern I have about the protocol review and consent process, and suggestions that might help to improve it in the event further implants are done.
Correspondence between the protocol and the consent form
As we discussed, a review of the protocol indicates that the lack of correspon dence between the studies you are conducting and those actually consented to is substantial and serious and should be corrected. Specifically: (a) The assertion in the protocol that the primary goal is therapy cannot stand scrutiny, the proto col itself needs to be amended to place experimental goals first, and therapeutic goals (if any)"in a clearly secondary position. (b) As to the experimental studies, none of the ones that are so clearly described in the protocol are detailed at all in the consent form, and this is, of course, the primary purpose of the consent form, i.e., to spell out what experimental things will be done, including their risks to the patient. Specifically, you need to at least describe the non-invasive studies (e.g., circulatory response studies; nutritional studies; and exercise studies); and to both describe in detail, and list the risks of the invasive studies (e.g., the hemodynamics studies; the pharmacological studies, including Isoproterenol, Dopamine, Sodium Nitroprusside, Nitroglycerin, and, unless it has been deleted, Ephedrine; and the studies with the Heimes driver). Since many of these studies are designed to take place at three different times (at the time of the implant; one week after the im plant; and 6-8 weeks after the implant), each occasion should have a separate consent form (the original master consent form should describe those studies that will be done at the time of the implant, and indicate what followup studies are planned and that a separate consent form and process will be employed for the followup studies).
'Defining the role of the Subject's "Advocate" and that of the IRB "monitor"
The role of each of these separate individuals is unclear and needs clarification if they are to contribute to making the consent process a meaningful one for the subject and his family.
The Role of the IRB
My own impression is that the Humana IRB has done both you and your subjects a disservice by permitting use of the current consent form (for the reasons out lined both above, and infra), and by failing to either understand or support the basic functions of an IRB. Specifically, the three members of the IRB I met with argued vigorously for such propositions as: (1) the implant procedure was not experimental at all, but "the whole thing is primarily therapeutic" and we should treat these research subjects "like any other patient;" (2) informed consent is 
III. ARTIFICIAL HEARTS FOR "TEMPORARY" USE
Dr. Denton Cooley implanted the world's first two mechanical "just a parade of horribles" to the patient and so serves only to scare them; and (3) withdrawal from the experiment by the research subject would be "murder" if the researcher permitted it and turned off the artificial heart. . .. If the Humana IRB actually believes the propositions these possibly non-representative members put to me on August 27, 1985, it should come as no surprise to anyone that they found their task so simple that they were able to adopt the Utah form almost verbatim, changing primarily only the identity of the hospital in the submitted consent form.
The Publicity Clause
As I discussed with you, members of the IRB, and your attorneys, this clause is unprecedented and unacceptable. Subjects have never before in the history of human experimentation had to sign away all rights to privacy regarding every possible mode of communication, and should not have to in their case. It should be separated from the "master form" and rewritten in a manner which more closely mirrors a reasonable attempt to protect privacy. [Humana's pUblicity clause provides: "I am fully aware of the considerable public interest anticipated in my story as a recipient of a Total Artificial Heart. I am also aware that Humana Hospital Audubon has an obligation to disseminate medical information concerning my hospital course as deemed appropriate in the judgment of my phy sician. In addition to those materials identified in paragraph 13 [regarding medi cal professionals and the FDA] Humana Hospital Audubon, as approved by my physician, is authorized to make, or permit to be made, photographs, slides, films, video tapes, recordings and other means of recording and/or communicating hereinafter referred to as "material(s)," that may be used in newspapers, maga zine articles, television, radio broadcasts, movies or any other media or means of dissemination. I consent to the use of my name, likeness, or voice for such pur poses. I agree that Humana Hospital-Audubon or Humana, Inc. will be the sole and exclusive owner of such materials, and I release the Humana Heart Institute, International, Humana, Inc., Humana Hospital Audubon, their officers, agents and employees from all claims of liability with respect to the showing, use or dissemination of such material(s). I understand that the materials which are made public, as described in this paragraph, will protect my modesty and be within generally accepted bounds of good taste.]
Deletion of the Right to Withdraw Clause
(a) This is, as we discussed at length, a profound .and serious omission, since it seems to indicate that all involved have adopted the view of the IRB Chairman that terminating the experiment by turning off the artificial heart, even at the express demand of the patient, is a crime of some sort, perhaps murder. This conclusion indicates that very little thought has gone into this. I can understand the reasons for not overly-dramatizing this issue with the promise of a "key" to tum off the driver; but to swing entirely the other way and imply that under no circumstances can the patient or his doctor tum off or disconnect the artificial heart is to transform the subject entirely into a means of preserving the "life" of the artificial heart, instead of a willing volunteer in an experiment that concludes when he decides he has had enough. If this really is what is intended, at the very least subjects should be informed in advance that the artificial heart will be kept in place and running as long as possible no matter what the patient, his family and doctor wants, and no matter what his physical condition. Even if the artifi cial heart was therapeutic (which I think we agree it is not) a patient would still
DEATH AND THE MAGIC MACHINE !O3
have the right to order its use disconnected, as patients can now discontinue kid ney dialysis or mechanical ventilator support, or even artificial feeding, although all are necessary to maintain their lives. When the artificial heart becomes totally implantable and reliable enough to be therapeutic, we may have debating issues here; but at the current time arguments that turning off the Utah drive with the patient's consent is "murder" is simply uniformed hysteria, that has the result of making the patient a servant of the artificial heart itself. (b) Related to this is the problem of what to do if the patient is incompetent to make a decision. This eventuality should be planned for in advance (since it is very predictable) and the prospective subject asked to (I) spell out as best he can the circumstances under which he wants the heart turned off if he cannot communicate; and (2) designate a proxy with the authority to make the decision for him under the criteria he outlines.
The Consent Process
We all believe that consent is a process, not a form, and that the form is merely evidence that the process actually took place ... I think it would be useful to devise a question or two to ask the subject regarding every major point made in the consent form. The question should not, of course, be one that can simply be answered "yes" even if "yes" does not reflect the patient's actual understanding, e.g., "Do you understand all of the risks?" Instead, the question should demand use of specific information about the experiment that you believe it is critical that they understand in order to give their "informed consent" to it. (e.g., Can you describe the types of studies I am going to perform on you and the artificial heart shortly after it is implanted?; What happened to the last five individuals who had permanent artificial hearts implanted in them?, etc.). If the subject cannot ade quately answer the questions, he is incapable of giving informed consent, and cannot be accepted as a suitable candidate until the information needed to answer the questions is mastered. Such a procedure may help both the researcher and the subject to take the informed consent process more seriously. Realistic answers probably will not be found in simply trying to apply rules and regulations developed primarily for routine drug studies. What is involved in the artificial heart experiment is nothing short of transforming a life, and with it all previous interrelationships with the environment and with one's family. In deed, your experiments will probably teach as much about these transformations and interactions than about the interaction of the artificial heart with the human body. Accordingly, what is needed is much more relevant (as opposed to simply more detailed) information about the impact of the artificial heart on one's lifes tyle, mobility, psychology, and relationships to one's family. Indeed, if as now appears to be the case, the artificial heart utterly transforms not only the patient, but also the patient's family (at least the entire life of the patient's spouse) a good deal more attention needs to be given to this aspect of the experiment. Much, if not all, of this information should be supplied to prospective subjects before they even come to Louisville to be formally screened for the program. Consent forms themselves are clearly inadequate. What is needed is a book-length treatment on the program and the experiences of the first subjects, together with appropriate illustrations. This could probably be usefully supplemented by videotapes of past and current recipients, as well as telephone conversations with their family mem bers. These should be mastered before a potential recipient is on site since the trip to Louisville itself represents a decision to seek the artificial heart and individuals are likely to arrive at Louisville with misperceptions of what is likely to occur if the artificial heart is implanted in them. It is, of course, much harder to dispel misperceptions that have been acted on than it is to present information to an hearts for temporary use in 1969 and 1981.30 After these two im plants, Dr. DeVries performed four permanent implants and Dr. Bjarne Semb performed one in Sweden. After these seven implants, "temporary" mechanical implants, used to sustain the patient until a human heart for transplant becomes available, have dominated the field. This use is controversial for many reasons, not the least of which is that as long as there is a shortage of human hearts for transplant, temporary artificial hearts are unlikely to save any net lives; they will only change the identity of those who actually obtain the human hearts. 3 I Moreover, the way these devices change the recipient's iden tity is an inherently unfair one, by permitting those with artificial hearts to "jump the queue" and become first in line for the next avail able matching human heart. 32
But my quarry here is informed consent. Initially, note that tem porary artificial hearts always have the possibility of becoming de facto permanent (e.g., if the patient suffers a complication, such as a stroke, that makes him or her ineligible for a human heart transplant). Since this risk is real,33 we should require informed consent procedures to be at least as rigorous as those for permanent implantation.
But the historical record to date is one of almost indifference to informed consent. This highly experimental intervention has been jus tified consistently primarily on the basis that it is a therapeutic modal ity in an emergency setting. The third use of such a temporary device (after Dr. Denton Cooley's two) was perhaps the most clumsy and uncommitted individual. Accordingly, as I think your own experience to date illustrates, by the time the subject is actually given the consent form to read (or reads it himself) it is too late for them to care about the consents or to "change their minds" and tum back from the course they seem to have inevitably em barked on .... Letter from George J. Annas to Dr. William DeVries (Sept. 26, 1985 HEALTH 187 (1985) .
33. For example see the cases of Mary Lund, who waited more than 40 days on a "temporary" artificial heart before obtaining a human heart replacement; and Bernadette Chayrez, who has received two "temporary" artificial hearts and lived on her second one for more than 200 days before dying during her second human heart transplant. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
embarrassing since it involved a device that was not even designed or approved for use in human beings. 34 I describe the case in some detail because it has set the tone for a rash of "me-too" experiments similar to those that followed Christiaan Barnard's first human-to-human heart transplant,35 and has directly caused the FDA to take a laissez faire attitude toward "temporary" implants that seems to be an abdi cation of the agency's responsibility to protect the public from un proven and untested medical devices.
IV. THE CASE OF THE PHOENIX HEART
On Tuesday morning, March 5, 1985, Dr. Jack Copeland, Chief of University Medical Center's Heart Transplant Team in Tucson, Ar izona, performed a human heart transplant on Thomas Creighton, a thirty-three year old, divorced father of two. The procedure was not a success, as Mr. Creighton's body rejected the heart. At 3:00 a.m. Wednesday morning a search for another human heart began, and Dr. Copeland placed Mr. Creighton on a heart-lung machine. At 5:30 a.m. the medical team placed a call to Dr. Cecil Vaughn of Phoenix, asking if he had an artificial heart ready for human use. Dr. Vaughn was scheduled to implant an experimental model developed by dentist Kevin Cheng into a calf later that day, and had never considered use of the device in a human. Nonetheless, he called Dr. Cheng. Dr. Cheng told him, "It's designed for a calf and not ready for a human yet." Asked to think about it for ten minutes, Dr. Cheng recalls, "I knelt and prayed." When Vaughn called him back he said, "The pump is sterile, ready to gO."36 The two helicoptered from the hospi tal to the airport, chartered a jet to Tucson, and then took another helicopter to the Tucson hospital. They arrived at 9:30 a.m. Wednes day morning. The implant procedure began at noon. Designed for a 35. Following Dr. Barnard's initial human-to-human heart transplant, about 150 human heart transplants were done at 60 places around the world in the next two years. There were almost no long-term survivors in the unseemly rush to join the "me-too" club of heart transplant surgeons, and this episode stands as one of the blackest marks in the history of surgery. B. JENNETT, HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE 84-85 (1984 calf, it was too large, and surgeons could not close the chest around the device. The implant maintained circulation until 11 :00 p.m. that night when, in preparation for a second heart transplant, doctors turned it off and put Mr. Creighton back on the heart-lung machine. By 3:00 a.m. Thursday, Dr. Copeland completed a second human heart transplant. The next day Mr. Creighton died.
The press treated the story like a modern American melodrama. USA Today called the implantation of Dr. Chen's heart "the fulfill ment of an American dream."37 The New York Times editorialized that "the artificial heart has at last proved it has a useful role ...."38 Time headlined the event as a "bold gamble";39 and Newsweek faulted the FDA, noting, "[i]t's hardly fair to doctors, or their patients, to make them break the law to save a life."40 The FDA initially termed the unauthorized experiment a violation of the law, but by week's end had done an about face and was flailing itself as "part of the problem."41 Dr. Copeland relied upon the same two basic excuses his prede cessors had used to justify the implant in the absence of the patient's consent: (1) the "only other option was just to let him die" so "we had nothing to lose"; and (2) in an emergency, a physician can do anything to save the patient's life. 42 Neither of these assertions can stand scru tiny. The physician may have "nothing to lose," but the patient cer tainly does. The choice is not, as the five permanent implant patients have all demonstrated, simply one between "life and death." The much more likely scenario is life in a severely disabled and debilitated state; a risk to which only the patient himselfor herself should be able to consent. The rationale that for a dying patient anything is justified, is an illustration of what Professor Katz has termed the "magical thinking"; that the doctor actually has the power to conquer death, and that prolonged life (or prolonging the dying process) is always a 37. Kuhn & Pesce, Heartmaker: A Dentist with a Dream, USA Today, Mar. 8,1985 , at lA, col. 3. 38. The Man with the Illegal Heart, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1985 , at A22, col. 1. Even after having the benefit of another nine months to rethink the issue, and after concluding that the permanent artificial heart "in its present form ... cannot be described as a suc cess"; the Times continued to describe temporary implants as "useful." Editorial, The Heart that Fizzled, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986 at A26, col. 1. 39. Wallis, A Bold Gamble in Tucson, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985 . Adler, When Life is on the Line, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985 , at 88. 41. Altman, Learning to Live with the Artificial Heart, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1985 , § 4, at 7, col. 3. 42. Hubert & Rothenberg, Patient has a 'long shot,' Arizona Daily Star, Mar. 8, 1985 reasonable medical goaJ.43
Likewise, the emergency argument is misplaced. All heart-dis eased patients will encounter such an "emergency" before they die, and to use this as an excuse to experiment dehumanizes them, making them "fair game" for any experiment no matter how bizarre or ex treme. This, of course, is not the law. "Emergencies" like this are anticipatable 44 and must be planned for, with the patient's consent, if risky and extreme experimental interventions are to be offered. 45
The FDA collapsed when Dr. Copeland asserted he was only try ing to "save a life" and did not notify the agency of his plans because he did "not want to make the government his [Mr. Creighton's] execu tioner."46 Professor Katz would probably see this assertion as another example of identity confusion on the part of the surgeon: Dr. Cope land seems to be projecting the role of "executioner" upon himself, and took objectively useless steps to try to prevent the death of his patient which he .had (albeit in an attempt to save him), directly caused by his own interventions. Conversation with the patient might clarify this confusion, but more than conversation is required to pre vent a recurrence of such well-intentioned but pointless "experimentation. "
Instead of attempting to curtail and contain experimental tempo rary use, the FDA actually took steps that served to encourage and spread it, and did so in a way that almost guarantees that nothing scientifically useful will be learned from temporary implants. In Octo ber, 1985, the FDA released proposed guidelines that permit any sur 43. Nor is it appropriate to permit physicians even to offer certain interventions to patients on the sole justification that the patients are "dying anyway." Taken to its logical extreme, this rationale can justify any intervention. This, of course, undercuts the entire rationale for an FDA or any other rules or regulations about human experimentation. Nor is it the law. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in upholding the FDA's authority to forbid the use of Laetrile, even on terminally ill cancer patients: "the terminally ill deserve protec tion ... from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise." U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) . . 44. Mr. Creighton was actually Dr. Copeland's third patient to experience immedi ate rejection of a heart transplant. Since rejection is a "reasonable foreseeable risk," it should be planned for, not treated as an ad hoc "emergency." See The Phoenix Heart, supra note 34.
45. The use of proxy consent to "emergency" experimentation, when allowed at all, is generally permitted only for alternative therapies that pose little or no additional risk to the subject, and even then only after a careful research protocol has been developed and independently approved by an institutional review board. MED. 397 (1986) .
46. Copeland, We Can't Sacrifice Lives to Risks, USA Today, Mar. 11, 1985, at lOA, col. 2. geon to use any artificial heart in an "emergency" like the one just described. 47 By February, 1986 , the FDA had also given four centers approval to do ten such implants each and by the end of 1986, sur geons had performed at least fifteen additional. "temporary" im plants. 48 There was no master protocol, no uniform patient selection criteria, and, as the reader should be able to guess by now, we have seen no advancements in the area of informed consent.
Indeed, the informed consent forms and processes devised by the first four centers to use the artificial heart as a planned temporary measure are all different and all significantly inadequate, suffering from all or almost all of the shortcomings involved in obtaining con sent for permanent use. It seems likely that the reason doctors have not taken consent seriously at all in the "temporary" setting is because the primary argument given for use of the temporary artificial heart is its alleged "emergency" nature. In fact, in at least two of the first five such implants, the patients themselves did not personally participate in any meaningful way in the consent process. 49 And in Europe's first "temporary" use, doctors did not even tell the patient of the planned procedure "because we wanted to prevent him from being dis turbed."50 This is unacceptable. The medical community should never view a patient who does not personally consent to its implanta tion as an appropriate subject for experimentation with the artificial heart since this is a profoundly radical experiment that can have pre dictable, devastating effects on the subject. 47. FDA, HHS, "Guidance for Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices; Availability," 50 Fed. Reg. 42,866 (1985) .
48. Mar. 10, 1986, at A 17, col. 4 . The case is reminiscent of another one collected by Professor Katz in his casebook, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 7, which concerned a twenty-three year old Brazilian cowboy who was the recipient of the first human-to-human heart transplant in South America. He was not told about the proposed transplant, and learned of it only when he heard a news broadcast about it in his hospital room a week later. He lived about three weeks: "[Tlhe Brazilian surgeons point out at the same time that no ethical questions are raised by da Cunha's [the patientllack of informed consent. If a man is incapable of understanding an operation he vitally needs, they say, there is no choice but to proceed. . .. Besides, add the surgeons, da Cunha was psychologically better olfnot knowing and worrying about his risks." MED. WORLD NEWS, July 12, 1968, at 9 10, quoted in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 7, 1098. Indeed, Dr. Copeland's third "bridge" patient (his second was a spectacular success),51 endured perhaps the most brutal course of any of the permanent or temporary recipients to date, and it is impossible to argue reasonably that her personal consent should not have been required for each step of her experimental course. Mrs. Bernadette Chayrez became the second woman in the world to receive an artificial heart on February 3, 1986. Four days later Dr. Copeland removed it, and replaced it with a human heart. The transplant was unsuccessful. Subsequently, without the patient's consent, but with that of her fam ily, she became the first person to receive a second artificial heart on February 9. The implant turned out to be permanent, and Mrs. Chayrez spent the rest of her life, 212 days, in the hospital on her "temporary" artificial heart. She died on October 11, 1986, shortly after an attempt to transplant another human heart into her body. 52
In commenting on the experience, Dr. Copeland has been unable to recognize the ethical issues, or properly separate his own identity from that of his patient. He has said, for example, "It was almost like we were married to her, we all felt so close to her after all these months."53 In this spousal role, he could not envision terminating the experiment even when it was a clear failure. In his words, "[i]f you cannot transplant a patient, the only option is to maintain them the best you can on a total artificial heart."54 He could not face the pa tient's death, and suggests that perhaps "a committee of bioethicists and critics who want to save a few bucks could tum the pump off ... let them tum the damned thing Off."55 The "damned thing" Dr. Copeland was referring to was, of course, the artificial heart; but he may just as well have been describing his patient. As for ethical problems, Dr. Copeland is clear, "I don't see any ethical problems at all in what happened with Bernadette ... I see the work that we are doing here in the same light as ... sending up the spacecraft into outer space. Now what possible benefit can we derive from that? Atremen dous benefit. Our endeavors are the same."56
With such a fantasyland view of one's activities, it should proba bly not be surprising that informed consent is a relatively trivial mat ter to the heart implanters. They should, however, recall that even at the height of our competition with the Soviet Union to put the first man on the moon, the United States rejected a proposal to send a manned flight before we could insure its safe return. Even though vol unteers could be obtained, it was thought to be a priori wrong to send a man to his death even for something clearly seen as in the national interest. Informed consent was simply an inadequate justification for the taking of a human life. It is also an inadequate justification for artificial heart experimentation. Even if it were sufficient, however, we are not taking it seriously at all in the temporary setting. And informed consent must be taken seriously, at least seriously enough to establish uniform minimal stan dards that all American centers using "temporary" artificial hearts must meet regarding informed consent. Of course, these should be developed in conjunction with a uniform master protocol and patient selection criteria, so that some useful scientific information can be ob tained from multicenter use. 57 The consent forms and processes from the four primary American centers currently doing temporary im plants demonstrate major variations on significant issues that should be clarified and agreed upon before further implants are permitted. S8 57. See also ReIman, Artificial Hearts-Permanent and Temporary, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 644 (1986) .
58. Three of the four centers used the Jarvik-7 (a smaller model was used for Mary Lund at Abbott-Northwestern, where she became the first woman recipient), and at Her shey a substantially similar device, called the "Penn. State Heart," was used. The specific areas of disagreement or significant divergence in the consent forms include: 1. The description of the nature of the experiment as contrasted with the artificial heart's past use. One consent form, for example, describes it as having been "successfully im planted in five patients"; one says it "has supported life in growing calves for up to 260 days"; another that it has been subject to "extensive testing in experimental laboratory animals and humans"; and the fourth is silent on its past uses and results. 2. The description of the risk/benefit ratio. None mention two of the complications that all four of Dr. DeVries' patients have suffered: hemolytic anemia and immunosuppression; and only one mentions pulmonary insufficiency as a possible complication. One form says that all reasonable alternatives have been discussed, the other three allege that use of the artificial heart is the "only alternative" available to maintain life. But even among these three there are variations; one hedges with the phrase that it is "quite unlikely" that I will survive long enough to obtain a heart transplant without it, while another asserts there isn't "any possibility" of survival without use of the device. 3. The ability to withdraw. One form doesn't mention this issue at all; two others use boilerplate language common to most consent forms involving drug studies, and one uses somewhat reasonable language on the right to withdraw, "recognizing that such a decision after the total artificial heart is implanted will result in my death." 4. Proxy consent. None of the forms provide any mechanism for proxy consent; and one actually attempts to do away with the consent requirement altogether by providing: "If I am too sick to be consulted, I authorize such procedures as are in the professional judgment of the medical staff necessary and desirable" for my life, safety or comfort." (emphasis added). (Vol. 9:89 proved the scientific reasonableness, proper use, clear patient selection criteria, adequate informed consent procedures, and clear rules on stopping individual experiments. Permanent artificial heart implants should be suspended at least temporarily because of the devastating results they have had on subjects and their families, because their orig inal justifications are no longer valid, and because the consent process used is too primitive to protect human subjects. Temporary artificial heart implants should be suspended for the same reasons, and addi tionally because there are no multicenter protocols, and the United States has yet to develop a fair and equitable method for allocating scarce human hearts.
Human experimentation is a public enterprise, and the use to which humans are put, as well as the mandatory minimum procedures used to protect their rights and welfare, are matters of serious public concern. As illustrated by the most public experiments in the history of the world, these issues are taking a back seat to the hype and glitz of what currently passes for "scientific medicine." It is imperative that we reassert the importance of human values implicit in the Nuremberg Code before the Code is quietly rewritten by well-meaning inventors and researchers.
I hope Professor Katz will find the following thoughts of another patient in the Cancer Ward a fitting conclusion to a discussion of "death-defying" magical heart implants and informed consent.
Of course he knew that since all people are mortal, some day he too would have to tum in his check. 
